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coverage also allows multiple location samples to 
calculate reasonable average estimates of radionuclide 
concentrations in room air. Consequently, a large facility 
can use several dozen CAMs throughout its radiation 
areas. As a generality of CAM operation, a large facility 
will also have a small set of spare units on site; a rough 
rule of thumb would be up to 10% of the number of 
deployed CAMs to serve as replacements for failed 
monitors. This paper reviews monitor operating 
experiences and good practices and gives some reliability 
and maintainability values for these instruments. 
II. EXPERIENCE DATA ASSESSMENT 
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) operates an 
Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) 
database to record equipment faults and human errors at 
DOE facilities.7 The reporting period of 1990 to the 
present has encompassed thousands of CAM units across 
the DOE Complex. A search of the database narrative 
descriptions for “continuous air monitor” returned 
415 ORPS reports (see Table I). Some reports were 
deleted from this study because they described a CAM 
correctly responding to airborne contamination; the 
majority of these reports occurred during 
decommissioning and dismantlement activities. Other 
reports were deleted because they referred to stack 
monitors rather than room air monitors. A third subset of 
the reports was deleted because a CAM was mentioned 
but the report described some other, unrelated equipment 
failures. These deletions left 219 reports attributable to 
personnel safety CAMs. As derived from Table I, 29.7% 
of failures were electrical (including loss of power and 
power supply problems), 26.9% of the failures were 
mechanical (mainly in the air pumping portion of the 
units), human errors gave 27.4% (roughly three errors by 
authorized CAM workers to each non-CAM worker 
error), 8.2% were radiation detector tube faults, and 7.8% 
of the reports were electronics faults.  
In the early 1990s, Lingren and Hitzman polled 
nuclear power plants about radiation monitoring system 
performance with a questionnaire.8 Failures of Geiger-
Muller and photo-multiplier tubes were noted to be one of 
the widespread issues at the 55 plants that responded to 
the questionaire. This is much different than the 8.2% of 
detector failures shown in Table I. Reasons for this 
discrepancy are not clear. Operating environments would 
appear to be similar and should not be a factor in this 
difference. Perhaps manufacturing improvements 
occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
One interesting issue is the number of CAM failures 
where the CAM did not annunciate a fault or otherwise 
issue some type of trouble alarm. In human-error-caused 
failures, the CAM did not annunciate 88% of the time. In  
42% of the mechanical faults and 38% of the electrical 
faults, the affected CAMs did not issue a trouble alarm. 
The only way personnel learned of the failure was either 
from daily testing or from an alert staff member passing 
by and noting that the CAM was not operating. Therefore, 
the periodic (daily or perhaps weekly) inspections that 
room air monitor CAMs receive is warranted and is a best 
practice for this type of instrument, at least for the 
presently used level of technology.  
Periodic checks are warranted for other types of 
monitors as well. Experience data with nuclear criticality 
alarms showed that for a 1-year test interval, the failure of 
the monitoring system to alarm on demand was 
1.7E?03/demand; for a 1-month test interval, the failure 
rate was 1.3E?04/demand.9 This is a full order of 
magnitude lower failure rate gained by the more frequent 
testing because the higher frequency of testing identifies 
both system faults and incipient faults or weaknesses 
before such faults propagate into device failure. Frequent 
testing that does not create additional system wear or 
decrease useful system life is a benefit to operational 
reliability and is a best practice. 
III. RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY 
DATA 
The ORPS reports describe the failure modes of 
CAM units but do not give enough information on units in 
use and time periods to calculate failure rates. Instead, the 
literature was searched for published failure rate data on 
air monitors. Several values were found and are given in 
Table II.10–13 Also, various Idaho National Laboratory 
(INL) records have been reviewed and provide enough 
data to support an order-of-magnitude failure rate 
calculation. A typical count of four faults per year at an 
INL facility gives a point estimate of 
4/[(44 units)(8760 hr)] or 1.0E?05/unit-hr. The 
1.0E?05/unit-hr failure rate range is a reasonable first 
approximation for the INL units in use. Taking the “all 
modes” failure rates in Table II and performing a 
geometric mean value for those data values gives 
2.6E?05/unit-hr, which yields good agreement with the 
INL cursory value and sets a suggested “all modes” 
failure rate value for CAMs of 2.6E?05/unit-hr based on 
the literature data. The INL data also gave 16 false 
radiation alarm events over 13 years, so 
16/[(44 units)(13 yr)] = 0.03 false alarms per CAM-year. 
There were no INL events of failure to alarm when 
required by airborne activity. There have been too few 
events of airborne activity challenging the INL CAMs, so 
any statistical estimate of failure to alarm on demand is 
not meaningful. If more demands to operate had occurred, 
the “alarm on demand” failure rate could be calculated for 
INL CAMs. 
TABLE I. Continuous air monitor data from DOE events reported in ORPS. 
Fault Category Subcomponent or Error 
Fault 
Count 
CAM
Alarmed 
the Faulta
CAM Did 
Not Alarm 
Fault 
Mechanical Faults 
Air flow problem Seal, solenoid, tube, air hose, valve, rotometer 11 6 5
Air flow environmental 
problem 
Windstorm, dust accumulation 7 0 7
Alarm Alarm not functional 3 1 2
Cabinet  Various cabinet problems 3 2 1
Cabinet Wheels 1 1 0
Cabinet Light bulb 2 1 1
Maintenance alarm Unknown fault caused alarm 7 7 0
Motor Blower motor failure/vacuum pump failure 12 10 2 
Motor Blower motor switch 2 1 1
Motor Bearings 1 1 0
Motor Belt 3 0 3
Recorder Strip chart 3 1 2
Timer Timer 1 0 1
Early life faults in new 
components 
Unknown 3 3 0
Subtotals 59 34 25
Electrical Faults 
Annunciator Panel problem, interface board 4 1 3
CAM alarm test or 
spurious alarm 
Unknown fault caused alarm failure or spurious alarm 3 1 2
CAM reading Erratic readings to control room, unidentified electrical 
component 
6 4 2
Loss of line power Damaged wiring from rainwater, wiring pulling loose, poor 
connection, short circuit, fuse, sensitive power connection 
10 7 3
Loss of line power Reason not listed in ORPS 18 11 7 
Loss of power supply Diode shorted out 7 5 2
Power supply problem Power flux, defective supply 6 1 5
Power supply problem High voltage error 1 1 0
Power supply problem Noise interference 8 8 0 
Power supply problem Pre-amplifier failed 2 1 1 
Subtotals 65 40 25
Electronic Faults 
Display Unreadable LED 2 2 0
Software Math error 2 2 0
Software Random access memory check sum error 12 11 1
Software Circulatory software error message 1 1 0
Subtotals 17 16 1
Radiological Faults 
Detector failure Unidentified Geiger-Müller tube, photomultiplier tube fault 16 11 5
Detector Mylar torn 1 1 0
Detector Rate meter stuck 1 1 0
Subtotals 18 13 5
TABLE I. (continued). 
Fault Category Error 
Fault 
Count 
CAM
Alarmed 
the Faulta
CAM Did 
Not Alarm 
Fault 
Human Error—CAM Workerb
Human error Air intake not repaired, vacuum line left off, vacuum left 
unplugged 
2 0 2
Human error Air flow set too high 1 1 0
Human error Air flow set too low 1 0 1
Human error Air flow blocked, glove on box, hand on air intake 2 1 1
Box problems Door not closed properly on CAM cabinet 1 1 0 
Box problems CAM covers not replaced correctly 1 0 1
Calibration Overdue calibration 7 0 7
Calibration Wrong set-point for radiation level 5 1 4
Calibration Used wrong check source 1 0 1
Human error Forgot to plug in, forgot to put valve line back in, forgot to 
reopen valve, forgot to put filter paper in 
9 0 9
Human error Forgot to remove from test mode 2 0 2
Outside cause Borrowed contaminated CAM to use 1 0 1
Outside cause Fail to turn building thermostat to correct temperature 1 0 1
Training error Incorrect inspection procedure followed 4 0 4
Training error CAM location placement error 2 1 1
Training error Maintenance error- dirty clogged pump 1 0 1
Training error Untrained in reading rated values  2 0 2
Training error Wrong part used 1 0 1
Subtotals 44 5 39
Human Error—Non-CAM Workerb
Human error Air flow blocked, covered air intake  1 0 1
Human error Informed supervisor did not change out CAM before 
calibration expired  
1 0 1
Human error Shift manager did not reconnect vacuum pump 1 0 1
Outside cause Electrical work not pertaining to CAM dislodged leads 1 1 0
Outside cause Saw cut power 1 1 0
Training error CAM location error 1 0 1
Training error Operator did not see/understand CAM alarm 1 0 1
Training error CAM turned off, unplugged 8 0 8
Training error Unplugged vacuum pump to quiet the area 1 0 1
Subtotals 16 2 14
a. Alarm designation includes maintenance, trouble, alert, or evacuation types of alarms that annunciated the fault. 
b. CAM workers are those trained and authorized to work on CAMs.  
Regarding maintainability, a crucial piece of data is 
the repair time for the units. Table III gives some data 
gleaned from the ORPS reports on maintenance times, 
combined with some averaged maintenance data from 
INL facilities. The CAM testing times are probably most 
applicable across various nuclear sites.  
The maintenance times have many variables, 
including the number of electronics or instrumentation 
technicians on staff that are qualified to repair a CAM, the 
number of spare CAM units held on site, the number of 
spare parts kept on hand or in stock rooms versus 
ordering, and delivery time to the site. Some of the INL 
CAMs are very old designs (some more than 40 years old) 
and were manufactured by companies that have since 
gone out of business. The older units have created 
problems with component failures, requiring more and 
more technician time for repairs as the units reach the end 
of their useful lifetime. Obtaining appropriate spare parts 
has become problematic for these older units. Lingren and 
Hitzman noted the same issue of CAM obsolescence at 
power plants.8 Small numbers of newer, digital CAMs 
have been purchased annually at the INL to replace the 
most aged units, targeting the most crucial locations first. 
TABLE II. Radiation monitor failure rates from generic data sources. 
Component 
Description Failure Mode 
Failure Rate 
(/hr) 
Upper Bound 
Failure Rate 
(/hr) Reference 
Radiation instrument All modes 1.43E?05 1.99E?05 [10] 
Zero or maximum output 1.943E?06 2.693E?06 [10] 
No output 0.972E?06 1.347E?06 [10] 
No change of output with change of input 2.320E?06 3.216E?06 [10] 
Erratic output 3.161E?06 4.382E?06 [10] 
High output 1.595E?06 2.211E?06 [10] 
Low output 1.595E?06 2.211E?06 [10] 
Incipient failure 2.755E?06 3.819E?06 [10] 
Radiation instrument All modes 1.098E?05 3.310E?05 [11] 
Zero or maximum output 2.28E?06 6.86E?06 [11] 
No output No value given [11] 
No change of output with change of input 1.79E?06 5.39E?06 [11] 
Erratic output 2.42E?06 7.28E?06 [11] 
High output 1.21E?06 3.64E?06 [11] 
Low output 1.20E?06 3.64E?06 [11] 
Incipient failure 2.08E?06 6.29E?06 [11] 
Radiation monitor Drift 3.82E?05 1.98E?04 [12] 
Failure 3.80E?05 8.32E?05 [12] 
CAM All modes 1.1E?04 Not given [13] 
TABLE III. Maintenance and repair times for CAMs.a
Activity Average Time Source 
Technician performs daily check of CAM operability ? 5 minutes INL data 
Technician investigates a suspected false CAM alarm; checks CAM filter paper 
with portable meter 
12 minutes INL data 
Technician restores power to an inadvertently de-powered CAM, verifies operation 5 minutes INL data 
Technician performs CAM weekly filter change 30 minutes INL data 
Technician performs monthly CAM interlock check 30 minutes INL data 
Replace a failed CAM with a spare unit 30 minutes INL data 
1.9 hours [7]b
CAM unit repair in instrument shop with spare parts on hand 9 hours INL data 
15.2 hours [7]b
CAM unit repair in instrument shop, requires ordering parts from vendor 10.5 days INL data 
8 days [7]b
CAM mean time to repair 43.5 hours [13] 
a. These times have been averaged from a combined set of older CAMs and newer digital CAMs. The times are 
considered to be generic for CAM units. Technician activities do not include travel time to the CAM unit. 
b. A few of the ORPS reports gave repair times and these times were averaged for presentation in this paper. 
As an example of the differences between sites, 
consider the data reported from the DOE Hanford site.13
Grigsby et al. give a mean time to repair (MTTR) value 
for CAMs of 43.5 hours. That value was found from a 
sample of four stack CAMs operating over a 2-year 
period; no MTTR data for room air CAMs were found in 
the literature. At the INL, the average CAM repair time 
with spare parts on hand was 9 hours; without spare parts 
on hand, the average was 252 hours, meaning parts 
procurement time drives up the CAM downtime. 
Averaging these two INL MTTR values gives 
130.5 hours, a factor of three variance from Grigsby’s 
value. Maintainability data can have such variability for 
the reasons described above. 
As an example of the use of these data, consider a 
facility using 50 CAM units. With the average failure rate 
of 2.65E?05/unit-hour times 50 units, inverting the result 
gives ? 755 hours for mean time between CAM failures. 
Therefore, the set of CAMs would experience one failure 
roughly once per month. Using the data from Table III 
shows that the MTTR is much shorter than 755 hours, so 
perhaps one or two spare units on hand to replace failed 
units is adequate (i.e., 2–4% spares). If the CAMs are 
positioned to give good overlapping coverage of facility 
areas then no spares would be needed as replacements 
during calibration sessions. Otherwise, another one or two 
spare units might be needed for use as replacements 
during calibration sessions. Summing the daily, weekly, 
and monthly checks in Table III gives an average of 62 hr 
of technician time per CAM per year. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The CAM experiences show that the highest 
percentage of failures is in power losses and in electrical 
components, followed by human errors and failures in the 
mechanical portion of these monitors. The current 
approach in the DOE Complex is to quickly replace a 
faulted unit with a spare CAM and take the out-of-service 
unit to an on-site shop for repairs. Daily operability 
checks and weekly functional tests are warranted because 
continuously operating CAMs, with their problems in 
drawing air and keeping power supplied to the unit, need 
frequent checks to verify proper operation. These faults 
are not always annunciated as trouble alarms by the CAM 
unit, so daily visits keep the units available to perform 
their tasks. Daily visits are a best practice for CAM 
operability. 
On a positive note, the detector tubes appear to 
operate well. The reports only showed 8.2% detector head 
failures over the 18-yr time span of occurrence reports. 
The literature search for CAM failure rates yielded 
the values given in Table II. Averaging the “all modes” 
failure rates produced a mean of 2.65E?05/unit-hr, which 
was in general agreement with experiences from the INL. 
This value is therefore reasonable to apply to CAM units 
if no component-specific, site-specific, or otherwise better 
data sets are available. 
The failure rates and repair times are useful for 
personnel safety assessment and for facility radiological 
control planning. Given the estimated number of CAM 
units intended for a facility like ITER, planners can 
estimate an initial number of spare CAM units to have on 
hand. The time data for CAMs can be used to estimate the 
number of radiological control technicians needed to 
support the CAM checks and calibrations. Repair times 
can be used to help estimate the number of spare units 
needed and the size of the technician staff needed at the 
facility.
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